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FOR LAW
ROBERT B. GOSLINE
Until recent years, the Law has spent its life far from the
category of "experimental science." Along with the other social
sciences, it has been kept from this category because it relates so
directly to the actions of human beings, which until recently
have been considered beyond analysis and entirely unpredict-
able. Many jurists who have written during the past thirty
years have sought the fundamental basis of the law in the ac-
tions of those most closely connected with the law, the judges.
In like manner, Vilfredo Pareto has sought the fundamental
forces of all social sciences in the actions of men. His Treatise
on General Sociology (i916)2 is concerned with the formula-
tion of a method by which these heretofore normative and in-
exact sciences may be put on a sound experimental basis.
Like Machiavelli, Pareto attempted to understand what
men do rather than what they ought to do,' for with an under-
standing of the forces which motivate the actions of men, we
will be able to explain the forces which guide and control
society.'
Experimental sciences are based on logical deductions from
facts which are established by observation. The only sociolog-
ical facts which we can observe are human acts, but these are
sufficient, for they correspond directly with the motivating
forces on which an experimental social science depends.5 These
i848 to 1923.
The English translation of Pareto's work is entitled The Mind and So-
city (Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1935) four volumes.
' Henderson, "Pareto's Science of Society"-SAT. REv. OF LIT., Vol. XII,
P. 3 (May 25, 1935).
' Ibid., p. 4.
" Homans & Curtis, Introduction to Pareto (Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y.,
1934), p. 19, 5o ft.
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facts can be divided into two fundamental groups, (i) experi-
mental and (2) non-experimental. The experimental acts are
based on determined facts and look toward and are motivated
by a definite purpose. The non-experimental acts are the ex-
pression of the Sentiments (motivating forces) of the actor.
Few actions are entirely of one type or the other, and the same
act in different circumstances may fit either classification.' Be-
cause non-experimental acts or acts predominately non-experi-
mental are expressions of the Sentiments, and because they com-
prise the major portion of the acts of men, Pareto chooses them
as the basis of his science of society.7 In so doing, he sweeps
aside the primary assumption of most other sociologists that
men act logically and experimentally in all cases.8
The purpose of the social system of Pareto is to make these
non-experimental acts intelligible.9 The fundamental motivat-
ing forces he calls Sentiments; the corresponding actions he
calls Residues; and to the rationalizations or explanations of the
actions he gives the name Derivations."0 Man has sought, be-
cause of his desire to be logical, to make his non-experimental
acts intelligible in his own way, that is, by giving them logical
explanations. Thus, he hides from himself their non-experi-
mental nature." Though these three factors necessarily inter-
act, the Residues (actions) are predominately the results of the
necessity of expressing Sentiments rather than the results of the
Derivations as men would have themselves believe. 2
On the basis of his two fundamental assumptions, e.g., (i)
0 Ibid., p. 70-78.
7 Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology-A Physiologist's Interpretation
(Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1935), p. 2I.
8 Ibid., p. 28.
' Handman, "The Sociological Method of Vilfredo Pareto" (Methods of
Social Science, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 193 1), p. 189.
10 Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology, op. cit., p. 2i, 22. To avoid
misunderstandings of terms, Pareto used hundreds of illustrations so that the
mind would focus on them rather than on the terms used. DeVoto, "The Im-
portance of Pareto," SAT. REv. oF LIT., Vol. XII, p. ii (May z5, 1935).
"Handman, op. cit., p. 139.
12 Homans & Curtis, op. cit., p. 79-85.
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most of the acts of men are non-experimental, and (2) these
non-experimental acts correspond directly to the Sentiments
which motivate society, Pareto classified the Sentiments in terms
of the acts to which they correspond. 3 A brief restatement of
this classification follows:"
I. Instinct of Combination. When a combination of facts
or ideas is for a purpose, it is probably experimental and can be
explained by its purpose. But when a combination is without
purpose, and facts are logically unrelated, it is probably non-
experimental and explainable only in terms of the Sentiment
expressed.
2. Instinct of Persistent Aggregates. Non-experimental
refusal to overturn established associations of facts or ideas.
3. Necessity of manifesting Sentiments by acts. Example:
parades.
4. Individual's need for maintaining his integrity. Ex-
ample: opposition to change of social order to which individual
is fitted.
5. Necessity for social life. Example: desire for uniform-
ity and likeness.
6. Sexual instincts. Considered as controller of mental atti-
tudes rather than physiological impulses.
The most important and serviceable of the classes are the
first two.' Pareto found confirmation of these categories among
the facts of history, and he used hundreds of pages of examples
to demonstrate his points." However, he recognized that his
general classifications were merely approximations and that
their greatest utility would be as starting points for further
refinement.'
" For a complete and detailed description of this classification, see
Homan & Curtis, op. cit., p. 96-98.
"Handman, op. cit., p. 140-42.
' Henderson, "Pareto's Science of Society," op. cit., p. Io.
". Homans & Curtis, op. cit., p. 6.
'7 Ilkd., p. 47.
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Likewise, Pareto classified Derivations (post-rationaliza-
tions of non-experimental acts) so that they might be recognized
and used as aids to point out the Residues (the non-experimen-
tal acts) :18
i. Simple affirmation. Example: unfounded statement.
2. Authority, appeal to. Example: quotation of bible.
3. Accord with sentiments or opinions. Example: wishful
thinking.
4. Verbal proofs. 9 Example: syllogism with ambiguous
middle term.
These methods of unsound rationalization which point to
non-experimental acts are present in nearly all writings ex-
cept the most carefully scientific works and colorless statements
of concrete sensory experiences, and "this theorem holds for all
men, always, everywhere."" This does not necessarily infer
that non-experimental acts are harmful but rather that they are
necessary functions of society.21
Thus, for Pareto, society could be represented by a series
18 Ibid., p. 178-9; Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology, op. cit., p. 35.
19 The power of words is often underestimated. "From the earliest times,
the symbols which men have used to aid the process of thinking and to record
their achievements have been a continuous source of wonder and illusion. The
whole human race has been so impressed by the properties of words as instru-
ments for the control of objects, that in every age, it has attributed to them
occult powers. Unless we fully realize the profound influence of superstitions
concerning words, we shall not understand the fixity of certain widespread
linguistic habits which still vitiate even the most careful thinking." Ogden and
Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., New York,
1927), p. 24.
20 Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology, op. Cit., p. 46.
2. Pareto was also concerned with the establishment of a concept of a
social system in equilibrium similar to the thermodynamic system or the
physico-chemical system. "Utility" is the equivalent of equilibrium, and the
two social classes, the "elite" or governing class and the "masses," representing
respectively the predominance of the instinct of combinations and the persist-
ence of aggregates, are the variables which produce or unbalance "utility."
Brooks Adams, writing early in this century, saw law as the resultant of
the saffie two social forces. Law shifts into a new equilibrium when the con-
trolling class is forced to give up established rights. "The Modern Conception
of Animus," 19 Green Bag 33 (909).
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of equations involving the variable forces motivating men and
resulting in the non-experimental acts which they attempt to
make appear logical and experimental."
Pareto's critics have said that his ideas were far from origi-
nal, '' and his proponents agree, but they go further to say that
no one ever before organized the same ideas into a coherent
scheme."4 . Pareto's psychology has been criticized as incom-
plete in the light of more modern research,2 because Senti-
ments cannot be considered fundamental as they are subject to
change by conditioning, and because history was his source of
information rather than a laboratory." His sociology has been
criticized because he was not familiar with the authorities in
that field.2 7  But, the critics do not seem to have destroyed al-
together the value of Pareto's idea that the actions of men are
the results of stimuli other than logical argument nor the value




The interest of lawyers in the ideas and classifications of
Pareto lies in the possibility of applying them to a science for
law." They apply only to those phenomena which can be re-
2" Handman, op. cit., p. 15 1.
22 McDougall, "Pareto as a Psychologist," I JOUR. oF Soc. PHIL. 38(1935).
2 Homans & Curtis, op. cit., p. z20.
2 5 McDougall, oP. cit., p. 45.
"" Murchison, "Pareto and Experimental Social Psychology," I JouR. OF
SoC. PHIL. 55, 6o, 61 (x935).
27 House, "Pareto and Modern Sociology," I JOUR. OF Soc. PHIL. 7901935)-
2 Pareto was not the first to recognize Residues and Derivations, but he
was the first to arrange them in a coherent system. Homans & Curtis, op. cit.,
p. Z2o. The concept of "organic thinking," "the action of an organism re-
sponding to stimulus," parallels Pareto's idea, for it accepts thinking and the
actions arising from it as responses to stimulus rather than results of experi-
mental logic. Deyser, Thinking About Thinking (Dutton & Co., N. Y.,
I9z6) p- 9.
" Although he didn't consider the matter in detail, Pareto felt that law
and the courts were proper subjects for treatment according to his classifica-
tions and analyses. "In a word, it may be said that the court decisions depend
largely upon the interests and sentiments in a society at a given moment; and
alo upon individuals and chance events; and but slightly, and sometimes not
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duced to and expressedin terms of acts of men which are non-
experimental.
Law has been described as the acts of judges. Justice
Holmes long ago said that his idea of law was what judges
would do."0 This concept has been widely accepted since that
time.
Many judicial acts are fundamentally non-experimental.3"
As mentioned above, experimental acts are based on prede-
termined facts and motivated by a definite purpose. At the other
extreme are acts which are entirely devoid of any basis in fact
and unguided by any purpose. These acts are non-experimental.
The acts of judges, as judges, are their decisions. Some de-
cisions are reached as a result of a search for a workable rule of
law. 2 These can be considered experimental for they are based
at all, upon codes or written law." He mentioned various factors which might
influence juries or courts and result in non-experimental decisions. Pareto,
oP. cit., sec. 466. Actions of courts and judges are pointed to in other parts
of the treatise as non-experimental. Ibid., sec. 1771-72, 1842, 2265.
3o "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, "The Path of the Law,"
io HARV. L. REv. 459 (1897); Collected Legal Papers (Harcourt, Brace &
Co., New York, 1921), p. 173.
"- "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syl-
logism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it
cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a
book of mathematics." Holmes, The Common Law (Little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, 1881), p. 1.
32 Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decisions," 36 HARV. L. REv. 641
(1923).
In Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N.Y. 490 (1922), Cardozo said, "Mutuality
of remedy is important insofar only as its presence is essential to the attainment
of that end. The formula had its origin in an attempt to fit the equitable
remedy to the needs of equal justice. We may not suffer it to petrify at the
cost of its animating principle." On this basis, many years of precedents were
overruled and the rule involved placed on a workable basis. Later, he com-
mented on this case in The Growth of the Law (Yale Univ. Press, New
Haven, 1927) saying, "Only the other day, the Court of Appeals reconsidered
the whole subject and put it on a basis which will be found consistent, so at
least I hope, with equity and justice." p. 15.
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on facts observed by the judge in his own experience and logical
deductions from these facts. On the other hand, a judge may
render a decision in which he has relied entirely upon his intui-
tion, his instinct based on his subconscious reactions.33 Between
these extremes are found decisions in which the ingredients,
empiricism and instinct, exist in varying degrees.3" Pareto rec-
ognized that few facts would be completely experimental or
non-experimental, but in acts which contain both characteristics,
one will predominate." The decisions which are predominately
instinctive may be treated as non-experimental. " Considered
thus, Pareto's concepts would apply to judicial acts.
Llewellyn and some of the other Realists have sought to
broaden Holmes' concept of law as the acts of judges so that
it would include the actions of laymen who become involved
with the law, administrative officials, lawyers, and all others on
whom the law impinges." It would seem that such actions
and reactions could also be classed as non-experimental where
conscious self-interest is not present to give them purpose.
" "But I . . . got my hunch, and by the practice of logomachy so
bewordled my opinion in support of my hunch that I found myself in the
happy position of having so satisfied the intuitive lawyer by the correctness of
my hunch, and the logomachic lawyer by the spell of my logomachy, that both
accepted the result and the cause was ended." Hutcheson, "The Judicial
Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decisions," 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 28o (1929). Jerome Frank has said, "Talks with candid judges have
begun to disclose that, whatever is said in the opinion, the judge often arrives
at his decision before he tries to explain it. . . A judge often arrives at a
dccision by a hunch as to what is just and fair or wise and expedient."
Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Thinking, 17 CORNELL L.Q.
594 (1932).
14 Cardozo has recognized that the logic of a judicial opinion may be a
false front. "We gather together our principles and precedents and analogies,
even at times our fictions, and summon them to yield the energy that will best
attain a jural end." Paradoxes of Legal Science (Col. Univ. Press, New York,
x928), p. 6o.
" Henderson, Pareto's General Sociology, op. cit., p. Ioz.
" "It is often said that the opinion gives the 'reason' for the decision.
In the vast majority of cases, it does not really do that, but . . . gives an
e'say on points of law." Radin, "Case Law and Star Decisis," 33 COL. L.
REV. 25O (1933).
37 Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence," 30 COL. L. REv. 435 (1930).
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Law, so conceived, would still be susceptible to Pareto's classi-
fications.
Applying Pareto's classifications to the types of human
action mentioned above, three types of legal science might be
formulated." Treating law as what judges do, you might es-
" Many different bases for a science of law have been suggested. They
can be grouped under the headings: (I) pure science of law; (z) analytical
science of law; (3) real science of law.
Pure science of law.
Adler, in commenting on Jerome Frank's book, Law and the Mod-
ern Mind, insists that a formal science of law must be recognized.
"Its subject matter is purely propositional; its only instrumentality is
formal logic." It is not incompatible with an experimental science of
law but supplementary to it as mathematical physics is to experimental
physics. Adler, "Law and the Modern Mind-Legal Certainty," 31
COL. L. REV. 103-4 (931). Kelsen treats the science of "law and
the state" as " a science whose sole object is to comprehend state and
law in their juridical reality, to grasp them notionally, to analyze their
structure, to explain their interrelations." Lauterpacht, "Kelsen's Pure
Science of Law," Modern Theories of Law (Oxford Univ. Press,
London, 1933), p. io6. Stammler distinguishes between (i) a tech-
nical legal science, which illucidates a given legal system, and (z) a
theoretical science which is "concerned with law as a set of rules
formulating the means to fundamental human purposes, and it has to
inquire into the real value of the means employed and to discover the
basis and justification of actual law." He would search for "funda-
mental principles" which would produce "complete harmony." Gins-
berg, "Stammler's Philosophy of Law," Modern Theories of Law, op.
cit., p. 38, 40. In contrast to his ideas of an experimental science of
law, Yntema deals with the "pure" or "formal" science of law. Such
a science would deal entirely with logical considerations of accepted
rules and concepts. Yntema, "The Rational Basis of Legal Science,"
31 COL. L. REv. 9z7, 929 (1931).
Analytical Science of Law
Hohfeld thought that the thing most necessary to a usable legal
science was a complete and exact analysis of the law as it exists. To
this end, he organized law on the basis of the legal relationships
involved. Cook, "Hohfeld's Contribution to the Science of Law," z8
YALE L. REV. 721 (i959). Holland states that "the science of law,
jurisprudence, consists of analyzing the positive law of the time. As
the law changes, the analysis must change." Holland, Jurisprudence
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1924), 13 ed. p. 7, 9. Dean Pound
describes a group of jurists who believe that the law is complete now,
and that the science of law deals only with analyzing cases, etc., and
finding out what law exists. Pound, "Analytical Jurisprudence," 41
HARV. L. REV. 174 (1928). Salmond treats the "practical juris-
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tablish a descriptive science of law based on the analysis of the
non-logical actions of the judges. Or, treating law more
broadly as not only what judges do, but also what juries, lay-
men, lawyers, and administrators do, you might esablish a de-
scriptive science dealing with the non-logical actions of all these
people. Still another possibility is that after an analysis is
made, you might measure the efficiency of the operation of the
law according to some predetermined norm and then alter the
precepts to accomplish more effectively the ends thought de-
sirable. This would make law an experimental science. All
three types of legal science have been considered by modern
writers.
The first mentioned type, a descriptive science dealing only
with the actions of judges, is most strongly supported by Key-
ser. Starting from the assumption that the decisions (the dis-
tinctive behavior) of judges are the focal point of law, he con-
cludes that the science of law should consist of "categorical
propositions describing the behavior of judges."3 Analogous
to Pareto's Sentiments are Keyser's "variables on which ju-
dicial behavior depends": (I) modes and forms of business;
(2) manners, customs, and mores; (3) religious opinion and
feeling; etc.4
prudence of civil law" as including (i) systematic exposition of the
legal system as it now is, (2) consideration of its historical develop-
ment, and (3) a description of what law ought to be. Salmond,
Jurisprudence (Stearns and Haynes, London, 1913), P. 3-6.
Real science of law (law in fact)
This is the plane on which this article deals with the science of law,
the consideration of law as it operates. Within this class are suggested
the three variations: (i) a descriptive science based on the actions of
judges; (2) a descriptive science based on the actions of all those in
touch with the law; and (3) an experimental science of law which
seeks to describe the operation of law in society and later correct the
defects found and make law more efficient.
' Keyser, On the Study of Legal Science, 38 YALE L. J. 416 (i9z9).
Keyser presents his idea of a science of law based on judicial behavior in
contrast with a "mathematical science" of law based on dealings in hypo-
thetical propositions. Ibid., p. 415, 420.
1o Ibid., p. 418.
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He is not alone in his emphasis of the importance of the
behavior of the judges, for writers who have considered the
"judicial process" a distinctive and important phenomena point
to the same conclusion as that reached by Keyser, i.e., a science
of law must take into consideration the actions of judges."' As
long ago as 1897, Holmes mentioned that the fear of Socialism
had influenced judicial decisions and suggested that such feel-
ings might be the very root and nerve of an inarticulate and
unconscious judgment which was hidden from view by a logic-
ally stated opinion.42 And, in the same vein, Cardozo has said
that "history, or custom ... or some compelling sentiment of
justice or sometimes a semi-intuitive apprehension of the per-
vading spirit of the law" enters into the judge's judicial opera-
tion.43
Philosophical and psychological considerations of the "ju-
dicial process" have led to an analysis similar to Pareto's.
Dewey divided all human conduct into two classes: (i) action
from routine, instinct, appetite or blind hunch; and (2) action
41 The fact that judges give lip service to stare decisis does not minimize
the fact that the actions of judges are of primary import in shaping the law.
"With us a precedent will govern a case 'on all fours.' But it may do much
more. We distinguish it and limit it, or we extend its application and develop
its principle." Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decisions," 36 HARV. L. REv.
64 (1973).
"Judges have made worthy, if shamefaced, efforts, while giving lip service
to a rule, to riddle it with exceptions and by distinctions reduce it to a
shadow." Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, infra., p. 155. "The
paradox of the situation is that granting there is value in a system of prece-
dents, our present use of illusory precedents makes the employment of real
precedents impossible. Rules are limited to the 'precise question' involved in
the earlier case. Minute differences in the circumstances of two cases will
prevent any arguments being reduced from one to the other." And the earlier
case comes to mean only what the later judge says it does. Frank, Law and
the Modern Mind (Bretano's, New York, 1930), p. 148-149.
42 Holmes, "The Path of the Law," op. cit., p. 465, 467. "You can
give any conclusion a logical form." Ibid., p. 466. "The law never succeeds
in becoming a completely deductive system. The law needs the logical use
of concepts and an orderly and logical classification of legal relations. But it
must be realized that such classification is not absolute and immutable." Cohen,
"The Place of Logic in the Law," 29 HARV. L. REv. 62? (x916).
43 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale Univ. Press, New
Haven, 1921), p. 43.
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based on experimental logic." He sees in the written opinions
of the judges an attempt to cover up actions of the first class
and make them look like actions of the second class.4" Ex-
pressed slightly differently, the psychologist sees in the judges'
actions the conflict between the conscious and the subconscious
motives of the judges, one seeking to conform with what he
would have others believe he is doing, and the other seeking
to express the judge himself."
Thus, there are those who would emphasize what judges
do as a basis for a science of law and those who would apply
an analysis of these actions similar to Pareto's, but the classifi-
cation on which Pareto's analysis would be based makes the
possibility of an exact descriptive science of judge law more real.
The second possible type of a legal science, a descriptive
science involving the actions and reactions of all persons who
come into contact with the law, is little more than a broadening
of the first type with a shift of emphasis from judges in appel-
4' Dewey, "Logical Method and the Law," IO Cornell L. Q. 17 (1925).
Dewey does not mean to minimize the importance of the instinctive or hunch
actions, for he says, "long brooding over conditions, intimate contact associ-
ated with keen interest, thorough absorption in a multiplicity of allied experi-
ences, tend to bring about those judgments which we call intuitive; but they
are true judgments because they are based on selection and estimation with
the solution of a problem as a controlling standard." How We Think (Heath
& Co., New York, i9io), p. 1os.
" Dewey, "Logical Method and the Law," op. cit., p. 24. "The
language of the judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the
logical method and form flatter the longing for certainty which is in every
human mind. But certainty is generally an illusion." Holmes, Collected
Legal Papers, op. cit., p. 18x.
A judicial "syllogism sets forth only the results of thinking." Dewey,
"Logical Method and the Law," op. Cit., p. zz.
"I Schroeder, "Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions," 6 CAL. L. REV.
90 (1918).
"Human motives and mental mechanism are not altered when one
assumes the judicial function." Ibid., p. 89. "Our logical thinking is not
separated, as by a Chinese wall, from other psychological processes, such as
willing, feeling, remembering, etc.; instead, there is a constant play of influ-
ences exerting themselves from these directions upon our thinking, yet not
sufficient to destroy the logical character in the formation of concepts." Wur-
zel, "Judicial Thinking," Science of Legal Method (Boston Book Co., Boston,
1917), P. 339.
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late courts to all the persons who influence the administration
of the law. Though not actually advocating a science of law
based on this broad concept, Llewellyn and Frank point out
that law in action includes a great deal more than judicial de-
cisions. Llewellyn takes the spotlight off judicial opinions and
the rules they state by proposing that we look at "words about
law" only to see the behavior they represent." And the be-
havior on which the operation of these rules depends is the
behavior of judges, jurymen, administrative officials, and lay-
men.48  Frank accepts the same broad, realistic view of what
goes to make up law.4"
These men seek only to present a true picture of the opera-
tion of the law. They want to show what facts exist without
evaluating them or suggesting reform. Any science of law
based on their concepts would be a descriptive or analytical
science like Keyser's, but it would have a much broader subject
matter.
Law as an experimental science is the goal of Yntema. He
realizes the need of the broad basis of a concept of law which
is set up by Llewellyn and Frank, but he would go further. He
would seek to build up a body of scientific information respect-
ing the actual operation of law,"0 and on the basis of such infor-
mation, he would seek to reform the law to conform to some
selected norm.5 This study of law would be continuous, and
47 Llewellyn, op. cit., p. 443.
48 Ibid., pp. 456-7. Real rules and paper rules must be distinguished.
"Real rules" are the practices of the court, what the courts do and what per-
sons dealing with the law try to do, and "paper rules" are the accepted doc-
trines of the time and place. You must seek to determine how far a paper
rule is real. Ibid., pp. 447, 450-
49 Frank, "What Courts Do in Fact," 26 ILL. L. REV. 658 (932).
'0 Yntema, "Legal Science and Reform," 34 COL. L. REv. 207 (934).
What is needed, says Yntema, is "a judicial census, a judicial clinic, and an
institute of legal research." Ibid., p. 222.
11 Ibid., p. 228. "Law is a relation of life, it is a coordination, a limit,
a guarantee of social relations, and its vigor and its real significance must be
directly deduced from an examination of life itself and of its coordination, not
from formulas which are more or less approximate, often fallacious and always
incomplete." Del Vecchio, "The Crisis of the Science of Law," 8 TULANE L.
REv. 32I (1934).
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as new precepts and concepts were needed, they could be tried. 2
If the new information showed that they were working proper-
ly, they could be incorporated into the law. If not, they could
be discarded. Reform would be effected through the legisla-
tive, administrative, and judicial departments. But before this
is possible, there must be an objective survey of what goes on
in the name of the administration of justice. 3 In such survey,
where "what is" is temporarily divorced from "what ought to
be," the classifications of Pareto would be applicable.
In a more general and inexact manner, Radin also sees the
possibility of an experimental science. He recognizes two char-
acteristics in a judge: (I) the arbiter; and (2) the judge
applying accepted legal concepts. 4 In expressing these two
personalities, the judge must temper the concepts on which the
law insists with a realistic knowledge and consideration of the
situation to which the decision is to refer. Experimentation
would be substituted for stare decisis, and past decisions would
be experiments rather than binding precedents.
Pareto looked at the acts of men disregarding the norm
on which they might be based. He discarded the concept, time-
honored in the social sciences, that men acted on the basis of
experimental logic and sought to explain their acts, or the
greater portion of them, as non-experimental. He took certain
fundamental characteristics of men's non-experimental acts to
be representative of the motivating forces of men and so of
society. He divorced these acts from what men said to explain
' - Holmes said long ago, "You must look to the practical effect of law
and build and develop your law to fit the facts found and the desirable social
end." "Law in Science and Science in Law," I HARV. L. REv. 443 (1899).
"' Yntema, "Legal Science and Reform," op. cit., p. z 19. A "disinter-
ested, continuous, informed study is needed to establish a body of scientific
information respecting the actual operation of law; . . . without such in-
formation, legal scholarship will remain esoteric and law reform ineffective."
Ibid., p. 22i.
"' Radin, "The Chancellor's Foot," 49 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1935)-
5 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
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them. Next, he classified the non-experimental acts, the moti-
vating forces, and the explanations so that any subsequent
knowledge concerning them might be placed in the proper
categories.
In the light of the authorities considered above, it seems
that the ideas of Pareto have a place in the scientific approach
to law, and when applied quantitatively and analytically to the
acts of all those persons who have to do with the law, or per-
haps only those of judges, they should serve to clarify the
nature of law.
